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The Missing Constitutionalism of Canada v Vavilov
KATE GLOVER BERGER
This article argues that the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent opinion in Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov—the biggest administrative law case in a
decade—pays insufficient attention to the constitutional dimensions of the case. Vavilov
represents, therefore, a missed opportunity to engage deeply with issues of structural and
administrative constitutionalism, issues that arise in countless public law cases, including
in Toronto (City) v Ontario (Attorney General). This article argues that when Vavilov’s
constitutional dimensions are brought to the surface, they reveal neglected possibilities in
the Toronto (City) appeal and map some of the legal terrain on which the case could be
received and should be analyzed. This article presents this argument in three parts. First,
it provides an overview of Vavilov, pointing to some of its key legal developments and
implications for administrative law. This part considers whether the majority reasons in
Vavilov promote a thin approach to constitutionalist reasoning in administrative cases.
Second, it considers two additional matters of constitutional structure that are at stake (but
insufficiently addressed) in Vavilov: (a) the consequences of an inconsistency between
legislation and unwritten constitutional principles; and (b) the significance of institutional
design to understanding the role, relationships, and reform of public actors. Each of these
matters is also at stake in Toronto (City) and this part shows why it is important to look to
Vavilov when resolving them. This article concludes with a discussion of a third matter of
constitutional structure and administrative constitutionalism that is implicated (but
neglected) in Vavilov, and is of relevance to Toronto (City): the place and status of the
administrative state within the Canadian constitutional order. Vavilov was a perfect
opportunity to engage with decades of administrative law developments in order to address
some of that neglect, but unfortunately, the opportunity was missed.

THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA’S 2019 opinion in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) v Vavilov was one of the most significant administrative law cases in a decade.1 In
it, the Court set out a new approach to choosing the standard of review in applications for judicial
review and a revised approach for assessing the reasonableness of administrative decisions. These
issues are quintessential matters of Canadian administrative law, taken up in Vavilov not because
of anything particularly demanding on the facts of the case but because, it seems, that the Supreme
Court deemed it time to respond to extensive criticism of the existing approach to judicial review
from administrative law scholars, counsel, and the bench.
While clearly an administrative law case, Vavilov is, this article argues, a case of
fundamentally constitutional character. The task the Supreme Court set for itself in Vavilov—that
is, to establish a principled, pragmatic, and just approach to judicial review that accounts for the


Kate Glover Berger is an Assistant Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School. She is grateful to Simon Archer,
Alexandra Flynn, and Mariana Valverde for organizing the Workshop on Canadian Municipalities and the
Constitution and for serving as guest editors of this Special Issue. She is also grateful to the editors and staff of the
Journal of Law and Social Policy for their valuable work on this piece and to the anonymous peer reviewers for their
insightful comments.
1
2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov].
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realities of the public institutions involved and of the parties affected by administrative action 2—
called on the Court to adopt not only an administrative law perspective but a constitutional
perspective as well. The exercise of judicial review is always constitutional in the small “c” sense.
It is an exercise in determining the proper relationship between organs of government 3—the courts,
the legislature, and the administrative state (standard of review)—in a particular instance and an
exercise of authority that lies at the inherent core of the superior courts’ constitutional jurisdiction,
namely to uphold the rule of law through assessing the legality of state action. 4
But determining the framework for how the courts should exercise their powers of judicial
review, rather than simply carrying out such powers within that framework, calls for a more
searching constitutional analysis. To properly realize the constitutional balance of power between
the legislature, the courts, the executive, and the administrative state, the Court must have a deep
understanding of the realities and status of each of the institutions involved, as well as a
comprehensive vision of how those institutions should relate to each other, that is, of “the grander
constitutional order, and the nature and position of the administrative state within that order.”5 In
“The Constitution of the Administrative State,” I observed that at the heart of critical calls for
reform of, and stability within, the jurisprudential approach to judicial review, that is at the heart
of the criticisms that ultimately led to Vavilov, is a longing for “a jurisprudence of administrative
law that is sustained by a grand vision of the Canadian public order” and “for administrative law
reasoning that connects individual cases to a thick conception of the administrative state.”6 I
concluded that in order to satisfy these longings, the Supreme Court need not be unanimous in its
approach to judicial review despite calls for stability and unity (and indeed, Vavilov was not
unanimous), but rather that the Court’s “analysis of administrative law questions [including how
to conduct judicial review] must be built from architectural materials, from inferences drawn out
of ‘the structure of government that [the Constitution] seeks to implement,’ from an accounting of
the assumptions that underlie the public order [and their implications], and from the links and
relationships between public actors and elements of the Canadian state.”7 In other words, I pointed
to a desire for a judicial review jurisprudence that is based on a careful and updated account of the
nature of the administrative state, its position within the public order as a whole, and the resulting
character of its interactions with other institutions of governance and the public.
This article continues this argument but with a more specific focus. It argues that when the
Court took on the task of rethinking its approach to judicial review in Vavilov, it should have drawn
more heavily on insights from architectural features of the constitution 8 (structural
constitutionalism) and from the relationship between administrative decision-making and
constitutional interpretation (administrative constitutionalism). Doing so would have promoted
coherence and comprehensiveness in the majority’s revised approach to judicial review in Vavilov
and future cases of judicial review, and would have also promoted the development of a consistent
2

Ibid at paras 4-15.
Ontario (Attorney General) v OPSEU, [1987] 2 SCR 2 at para 86 [OPSEU].
4
Crevier v AG (Québec) et al, [1981] 2 SCR 220 at 236-8.
5
Kate Glover Berger, “The Constitution of the Administrative State” in Marcus Moore & Daniel Jutras, eds, Canada’s
Chief Justice: Beverley McLachlin’s Legacy of Law and Leadership (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2018) 167 at 184 [Berger,
“The Constitution”].
6
Ibid at 169.
7
Ibid.
8
In this article, I use “constitution” to refer to “the global system of rules and principles which govern the exercise of
constitutional authority in the whole and in every part of the Canadian state”: Reference re Resolution to Amend the
Constitution, [1981] 1 SCR 753 at 874 and “Constitution” to refer to the formal, entrenched features of the constitution.
3
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vision of the grand constitutional order across constitutional and administrative law, showing how
cases of administrative law can be precedents for constitutional cases and vice versa. As this article
will show, this opportunity to participate in promoting this form of unity within public law was
not fully realized in Vavilov.
Before moving on to the specific claims of this article, the terms “structural
constitutionalism” and “administrative constitutionalism” warrant elaboration. Both concepts are
interested in the relationship between constitutional and administrative law and the interaction
between the constitution and the administrative state. First, I use “structural constitutionalism” to
refer to an interest in, or the study of, the architectural—or structural—features of the Constitution,
the interaction between these features, the ways in which these features change, and their
interpretive implications. The structural features of the Constitution reflect the “structure of
government that [the constitution] seeks to implement”9 and include the institutional design of
individual public actors, the institutional arrangements found within the constitutional order as a
whole, the foundational assumptions underlying the constitutional text, the implications of those
assumptions, and the relationships and interactions between constitutional elements. 10
A structural perspective is associated with a form of interpretation, namely structural
reasoning. As the Supreme Court explains, the “notion of architecture expresses the principle that
‘[t]he individual elements of the Constitution are linked to the others, and must be interpreted by
reference to the structure of the Constitution as a whole.’”11 “In other words,” the Court writes,
“the Constitution must be interpreted with a view to discerning the structure of government that it
seeks to implement. The assumptions that underlie the text and the manner in which the
constitutional provisions are intended to interact with one another must inform our interpretation,
understanding, and application of the text.”12 Put yet another way, structural reasoning draws
“inferences from the existence of constitutional structures and the relationships which the
Constitution ordains among these structures.”13 This article examines what Vavilov says about the
structural features of the constitution, in particular what it says about the administrative state and
its position relative to other state institutions by establishing a new approach to judicial review. In
addition, this article presents three issues of structural constitutionalism, each raised in Vavilov
and none adequately addressed, and each of relevance to the administrative law context and
beyond: the impact of unwritten principles on the constitutionality of legislation, the relevance of
institutional design to public law decision-making, and the constitutional status of the
administrative state.
The last two issues of structural constitutionalism, along with the Vavilov majority’s new
approach to judicial review, are also of interest to administrative constitutionalism. Administrative
constitutionalism is often used to refer to the interpretation and implementation of constitutional
rights by administrative actors. 14 Indeed, this is one of the core areas of interest for administrative

9

Reference re Reform of the Senate, 2014 SCC 32 at para 26 [Senate Reform Reference].
See e.g. ibid; Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21 at paras 76-103 [Supreme Court Act
Reference]; Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at paras 32-105 [Secession Reference].
11
Senate Reform Reference, supra note 9 at para 26, quoting from Secession Reference, ibid at para 50.
12
Ibid.
13
Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (New York: Oxford, 1982) at 74; Robin Elliot,
“References, Structural Argumentation and the Organizing Principles of Canada’s Constitution” (2001) 80 Can Bar
Rev 67 at 74.
14
See e.g. Sophia Z Lee, “Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to
the Present” (2010) 96 Va L Rev 799; Leonid Sirota, “The Unholy Trinity: The Failure of Administrative
10
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constitutionalists. But as Gillian Metzger explains, the scope of administrative constitutionalism
can be fruitfully understood to capture a more expansive set of interactions between administrative
action and constitutional interpretation in order to more fully work through the relationship
between administrative decision-making and the constitutional.15 The more expansive
understanding of administrative constitutionalism emphasizes the “constitutional dimensions of
seemingly ordinary implementation and policymaking, combined with its frequent creative
character”16 and is thus, interested in matters such as the “application of established constitutional
requirements by administrative agencies,”17 “the elaboration of new constitutional understandings
by administrative actors,” 18 and the “construction (or ‘constitution’) of the administrative state
through structural and substantive measures.”19
With these understandings, it may be obvious that setting the parameters for the exercise
of judicial review is a matter of interest to both structural constitutionalism and administrative
constitutionalism as it amounts to identifying the roles of and relationships between branches and
actors of government in supervision of the administrative state.20 But the claim of this article is
that the Court’s redesign of judicial review in Vavilov raises additional issues that are helpfully,
and importantly, exposed and elaborated by these two constitutionalist perspectives. More
specifically, this article explores how greater attention to the constitutional dimensions of judicial
review is necessary to working through the issues taken up in Vavilov. Taking on perspectives of
structural and administrative constitutionalism helps to expose these constitutional dimensions and
their relevance. Further, this article shows that the constitutional issues that could have been
developed in Vavilov but were not are relevant not only in the context of administrative review but
also outside the context of judicial review. In other words, when we approach the issues in Vavilov
through the lenses of structural and administrative constitutionalism, we can see how
administrative and constitutional law—and the administrative state and the constitution—are, and
indeed must be, in conversation with each other. More accurately, we come to wonder where the
edges of constitutionalism end in the administrative sphere.
To make this last point about the common terrain of administrative and constitutional law,
that is to show how public law more broadly can benefit from the analysis of Vavilov presented
here, this article relies on another public law case, Toronto (City) v Ontario (Attorney General), as
a case study.21 This case lies outside of administrative law, involving instead a constitutional
challenge to provincial legislation.22 This case is, invoking language used above, a quintessential
constitutional case. Thus, it may be thought that Vavilov and Toronto (City) have little to say to
each other. But this article shows that Vavilov, a major administrative law case dealing with
standard of review in judicial review, has much to offer when it comes to understanding and
resolving what is at stake in Toronto (City). These offerings are helpfully revealed when Vavilov
Constitutionalism in Canada” (2020) 2 J Commonwealth L 1; Matthew Lewans, “Administrative Constitutionalism
and the Unity of Public Law” (2018) 55:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 515.
15
Gillian E Metzger, “Administrative Constitutionalism” (2013) 91 Texas L Rev 1897 at 1912.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid at 1900.
18
Ibid at 1900.
19
Ibid at 1900. As examples of these kinds of works of administrative constitutionalism, see e.g. William N Eskridge
Jr & John Ferejohn, A republic of statutes: the new American Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010);
and Jerry L Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution: The Lost One Hundred Years of the American
Administrative Law” (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012).
20
The two perspectives have meaningful areas of overlap but neither is subsumed by the other.
21
2019 ONCA 732 [Toronto (City)].
22
Ibid at para 1.
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is examined through the lenses of administrative and structural constitutionalism. Put in more
critical terms, this article argues that the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Vavilov23—the biggest
administrative law case in a decade—is an example of insufficient judicial attention to the
structural matters underlying administrative review. Vavilov is, this article argues, a missed
opportunity to model the kind of structural and administrative constitutionalist thinking that would
strengthen Canadian public law and allow for deeper engagement with the countless issues and
cases that lie at the intersection of constitutional and administrative law, cases like Toronto
(City).24 As discussed below, when the structural issues at stake in Vavilov are brought to the
surface, they are illuminating, both in approach and in substance, for the Toronto (City) appeal, by
revealing neglected arguments and mapping some of the legal terrain on which the case would be
received.
This article proceeds in three parts. First, it provides an overview of Vavilov, pointing to
its key legal developments for judicial review and some of its implications for administrative law.
This part considers what the majority reasons in Vavilov contribute to the understanding of the
structure of Canada’s constitutional order and the thin approach to constitutionalist reasoning they
promote in administrative law. Second, it considers two additional matters of constitutional
structure that are at stake in Vavilov but which are insufficiently addressed: (a) the consequences
of an inconsistency between legislation and unwritten constitutional principles; and (b) the
significance of institutional design to understanding the role, relationships, and reform of public
actors. Each of these matters is also at stake in Toronto (City) and this part shows why it is
important to look to Vavilov when resolving the issues in Toronto (City). This article concludes
with a discussion of a third matter of constitutional structure and administrative constitutionalism
that is implicated but neglected in Vavilov, and of relevance to Toronto (City): the place and status
of the administrative state within the Canadian constitutional order. Vavilov was a perfect
opportunity to engage with decades of administrative law developments in order to address some
of that neglect, but unfortunately, the opportunity was missed.

I. VAVILOV AND A NEW APPROACH TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
The facts underlying Vavilov and (what became) its companion cases of Bell Canada v Canada
(Attorney General) and National Football League v Canada (Attorney General)25 had already
made these cases somewhat high profile before they arrived at the Supreme Court. Vavilov
involved the citizenship status of the children of undercover Russian spies who had operated under
assumed identities in North America for years (and is the real-life story behind a successful
American television show). Bell Canada cases dealt with the airing of American Superbowl
commercials, determining whether Canadian football fans could view these ads during Canadian
broadcasts of the Superbowl. While the facts may have continued to generate some public interest
in these cases, it was only at the Supreme Court that Vavilov and its companion cases took on high
profile legal significance as the “administrative law trilogy.”
23

Vavilov, supra note 1 at para 13.
Metzger argues, from an American perspective, that judges often avoid explicitly acknowledging the constitutional
dimensions of their administrative law decisions: Metzger, supra note 15 at 1914; and see Gillian E Metzger,
“Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law” (2010) Col L Rev 479 at 506.
25
Bell Canada v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 SCC 66 [Bell Canada]. This judgment deals with the issues at
stake both between Bell Canada and the Attorney General of Canada and between the National Football League and
the Attorney General of Canada.
24
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The applications for leave to appeal in Vavilov and Bell Canada arrived at the Supreme
Court a decade after the Court’s landmark decision in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick.26 Dunsmuir
had sought to simplify certain features of judicial review by reducing the number of standards of
review available in Canadian administrative law from three to two and by streamlining the analysis
used to determine the applicable standard in individual cases. It also sought to provide clear and
effective guidance on how to apply the two standards, striving to focus judicial review on the
merits of applications rather than the preliminary issue of standard of review. But in the decade
after Dunsmuir, consensus emerged that the Court’s laudatory aims had not been realized. 27
Criticism of the judicial review jurisprudence in the years after Dunsmuir was widespread, cut
across areas of law, and came from the bench, the bar, and the academy. 28
The leave applications in Vavilov and Bell Canada also arrived at the Court at a time of
unrest on certain administrative law issues amongst the judges. The Court’s administrative law
opinions since Dunsmuir and in particular over the past several years reflected deep divisions on
major foundational issues, including on the elements of the standard of review analysis, the
outcome of the analysis in particular cases, and application of the reasonableness standard. 29
Further, the case law reflected a restlessness amongst the judges, a restlessness borne of frustration
with the status quo and manifesting in repeated (and unsuccessful) attempts by individual judges
to corral the bench into consensus on reform related to standard of review.30 Further still, Vavilov
and Bell Canada arrived at the Court at a time when the case law had been affirming deference as
the preferred posture of reviewing judges,31 but was also witnessing a growing resistance to and
questioning of the foundations and realities of deferential review.32
The critical consensus from commentators, combined with the division, restlessness,
posture, and resistance within the Court itself, culminated in the Court’s decision to rely on Vavilov
and Bell Canada as an opportunity to “consider”—or more accurately reconsider—“the nature and
scope of judicial review of administrative action, as addressed in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick,
[2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 2008 SCC 9, and subsequent cases.”33 Announcing this intention in its (very
rarely issued) reasons on the applications for leave to appeal, the Court further noted, “[t]o that
end, the appellant and respondent are invited to devote a substantial part of their written and oral
submissions on the appeal to the question of standard of review, and shall be allowed to file and
serve a factum on appeal of at most 45 pages.”34 Three months later, the Chief Justice appointed
26

2008 SCC 9 [Dunsmuir].
See e.g. Paul Daly and Leonid Sirota, Canadian Journal of Administrative Law and Practice Special Issue - A
Dunsmuir Decade/Les 10 ans de Dunsmuir (Toronto: Carswell, 2018); David Stratas, “The Canadian Law of Judicial
Review: A Plea for Doctrinal Coherence and Consistency” SSNR (17 February 2016), online:
<ssrn.com/abstract=2733751 > [perma.cc/35DL-7BHU].
28
Ibid.
29
See e.g. Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32 [TWU]; Edmonton (City) v
Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd., 2016 SCC 47 [Edmonton East]; Canada (Canadian Human Rights
Commission) v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 SCC 31 [CHRC]; Dunsmuir, supra note 26.
30
See e.g. Wilson v Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, 2016 SCC 29 [Wilson]; TWU, supra note 29.
31
See e.g. Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC
62 [Newfoundland Nurses]; Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011
SCC 61 [Alberta Teachers]; McLean v British Columbia (Securities Commission), 2013 SCC 67 [McLean].
32
See e.g. Edmonton East, supra note 29; CHRC, supra note 29.
33
Bell Canada v Canada (Attorney General), 2017 FCA 249, leave to appeal to SCC granted, 37896 (10 May 2018);
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v Alexander Vavilov, 2017 FCA 132, leave to appeal to SCC granted, 37748
(10 May 2018).
34
Ibid.
27
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two amici curiae to make written and oral submissions in the three cases, and the next month,
Justice Karakatsanis granted intervenor status to the twenty-seven individuals and groups that had
applied to participate.35 With these developments, the much-hyped and eagerly anticipated
administrative law trilogy—with Vavilov as the lead case—was born.
There is no better reminder of the practical and material impact that administrative decision
makers can have on individuals than Vavilov. This article focuses on the legal analysis and
implications of the case, but does so with full appreciation that this case is ultimately about the
traumatic personal experience of two brothers that was exacerbated and legalized by failures of
bureaucratic decision-making.36 In a condensed version of the key legal facts,37 this case begins
with a decision of the Registrar of Citizenship (“Registrar”) to cancel the citizenship certificate of
Alexander Vavilov. Mr. Vavilov was born in Canada in 1994 to parents who, at the time and for
many subsequent years, were believed to be Canadian citizens. As a Canadian-born child of
Canadian parents, Mr. Vavilov was legally entitled to Canadian citizenship. 38 In 2010, it was
discovered that Mr. Vavilov’s parents had been living in Canada and then in the United States
under false identities and had been, for Mr. Vavilov’s whole life, operating as undercover agents
for Russia. After his parents pled guilty to charges of espionage and were returned to Russia, Mr.
Vavilov applied to renew his Canadian passport; his application was denied. He was told that, in
addition to his Canadian birth certificate, he needed a certificate of citizenship in order to renew
his passport. He applied for and received this certificate in 2013; the following year, it was
cancelled.
The Canadian Registrar of Citizenship is responsible for granting and, when necessary,
cancelling certificates of citizenship and so, it was the Registrar who ultimately cancelled Mr.
Vavilov’s citizenship certificate (“the cancellation decision”). The Registrar’s decision was based
on a report prepared by an analyst within Citizenship and Immigration Canada. The report included
an interpretation of section 3(2)(a) of the Citizenship Act. Section 3(2)(a) establishes an exception
to the general rules of citizenship entitlement. It provides that the general rule that a person born
in Canada is entitled to citizenship “does not apply to a person if, at the time of his birth, neither
of his parents was a citizen or lawfully admitted to Canada for permanent residence and either of
his parents was (a) a diplomatic or consular officer or other representative or employee in Canada
of a foreign government.”39 The report concluded that section 3(2)(a) applies to employees of
foreign governments even if those employees did not enjoy diplomatic and consular privileges.
Accepting this interpretation and applying it to Mr. Vavilov’s case, the Registrar determined that
Mr. Vavilov was not entitled to Canadian citizenship and thus, cancelled his certificate pursuant
to section 26(3) of the Citizenship Regulations.40
Mr. Vavilov applied for judicial review of the Registrar’s decision on grounds of
procedural unfairness and substantive unreasonableness. The Federal Court dismissed the

Supreme Court of Canada, “Docket 37748 Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Alexander Vavilov” Supreme
Court of Canada (4 May 2018), online: <www.scc-csc.ca/case-dossier/info/dock-regi-eng.aspx?cas=37748>
[perma.cc/DCW8-C275].
36
The Associated Press, “Son of Russian Spies Relieved to Keep Canadian Citizenship” (21 December 2019), online:
CBC
News
<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/son-of-russian-spies-relieved-to-keep-canadian-citizenship1.5405790> [perma.cc/EZ6Q-GWXX].
37
Facts summarized in Vavilov, supra note 1.
38
Citizenship Act, RSC 1985, c C-29, s 3(1).
39
Ibid, s 3(2)(a).
40
SOR/93-246, s 26(3).
35
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application.41 On appeal, a majority in the Federal Court of Appeal held that the Registrar’s
interpretation of section 3(2)(a) of the Citizenship Act was unreasonable and quashed the
cancellation decision.42 The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration appealed to the Supreme
Court. At this stage and in the ways noted above, the case became about much more than Mr.
Vavilov’s citizenship status.
On the merits, the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that the Registrar’s interpretation
of the Citizenship Act was unreasonable and thus, the decision to cancel Mr. Vavilov’s certificate
of citizenship could not stand. But the Court was divided on many aspects of the broader agenda
it had set for itself. There is much to explore in the division between the seven-judge majority and
the concurring minority reasons of Justices Abella and Karakatsanis, and indeed, much to analyze
and assess in the case as a whole. This article does not try to exhaust that analysis and assessment.
There is much more to say about Vavilov from a general administrative law perspective, 43 as well
as from the perspective of narrower areas of law under the administrative law umbrella. 44 And
there will be much to learn about the impact of Vavilov in these areas as reviewing courts carry
out the daily practical work of judicial review and as decision-makers respond to the systemic
demands of the case on the administrative justice sector. At this time, this article aims to contribute
one claim to the conversation about the future of judicial review, namely that Vavilov represents a
missed opportunity to surface many of the structural and constitutional issues that always underlie
judicial review and that underlie the specific new approach to judicial review established in
Vavilov. To make this argument, the article focuses on the majority opinion in Vavilov and its main
claims. Accordingly, following the majority’s analysis, the summary of Vavilov set out below
focuses on two issues: the new standard of review analysis, and the majority’s guidance on
applying the reasonableness standard.

A. THE NEW STANDARD OF REVIEW ANALYSIS
One of the innovations of the Dunsmuir era was to rely primarily on precedent, categories,
presumptions, and general expectations when identifying the standard of review in any particular
case. The aim was simplification and so the Dunsmuir “standard of review analysis”45 sought to
make the applicable standard easily identifiable in most cases. Contextual analysis was supposed
to be rare and relied on only when necessary. In this way, Dunsmuir marked a turn away from the
“pragmatic and functional” or factors-based approach to determining standard of review that
governed the pre-Dunsmuir era.
To respond to the critiques of Dunsmuir and its jurisprudential progeny, Vavilov doublesdown on categories and simplification, writing context out of the standard of review analysis
completely. The majority wants “greater coherence and predictability” 46 in the law of standard of
review, seeking to overcome demonstrable problems in real cases: uncertainties about when to rely
41

Vavilov v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 960.
Vavilov v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FCA 65.
43
For an early contribution, see e.g. Paul Daly, “The Vavilov Framework and the Future of Canadian Administrative
Law” SSRN (12 February 2020), online: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3519681>
[perma.cc/7LA6-R8AH].
44
For an early contribution, see e.g. Jamie Chai Yun Liew, “A Preliminary Assessment of whether the Vavilov
Framework Adequately Addresses Concerns of Marginalized Communities in the Immigration Context” (2020) 98:2
Can Bar Rev 398.
45
Dunsmuir, supra note 26.
46
Vavilov, supra note 1 at para 10.
42
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on contextual factors, selective commitments to legislative intent, undue complexities in applying
the standard of review analysis, and access to justice concerns flowing from the “costly debates”
over standard of review.47 Accordingly, the majority sets out a new standard of review analysis,
one that is intended to catch all cases without the need for contextual analysis.48
What does the new framework entail?
The starting point is a presumptive standard of reasonableness applied across all
applications of judicial review. Invoking precedential trends and legislative intent, the majority
explains, “for years, this Court’s jurisprudence has moved toward a recognition that the
reasonableness standard should be the starting point for a court’s review of an administrative
decision.”49 While an incremental step towards a presumptive application of reasonableness had
been taken in Alberta Teachers50 and Edmonton East,51 the Vavilov majority completes the
journey, stretching the limited presumption established in those cases to all applications of judicial
review. The majority justifies this stretch on the basis of “respect for the legislature’s institutional
design choice to delegate certain matters to non-judicial decision makers through statute.”52
By defining the relevant legislative intent in terms of “institutional design,” the majority
abandons a long-standing debate over the role of administrative expertise in the standard of review
analysis. After Vavilov, courts should no longer speculate as to the legislature’s specific rationale
for establishing a particular administrative scheme or presume that an administrative actor’s
expertise justifies deference. Rather, the legislature’s ultimate institutional design choice to
delegate a power to an administrative body cuts across all other possible rationales on which the
legislature may have been relying, whether expertise, efficiency, flexibility, accessibility, and so
on. “Institutional design” serves as an umbrella under which all of these rationales fit. The effect
is that a “reviewing court need not evaluate which of these rationales apply in the case of a
particular decision maker in order to determine the standard of review. Instead … it is the very fact
that the legislature has chosen to delegate authority which justifies a default position of
reasonableness review.”53
The Vavilov presumption of reasonableness is, though, only a presumption. It is rebuttable
on two grounds.
First, legislative intent. Reasonableness will be displaced when the legislature “has
indicated that it intends a different standard or set of standards to apply.”54 This will be the case in
two kinds of situations: (a) where the legislature expressly prescribes the applicable standard of
review; or (b) where the legislature provides that the decisions of a certain administrative actor can
be appealed to a court. 55 Establishing this statutory appeal mechanism to a court is, on the Vavilov
approach, taken as a clear signal that the legislature intended for appellate standards to apply when
the administrative decision at issue is challenged in court.
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Second, the rule of law. Reasonableness will be displaced when the rule of law requires
that the correctness standard apply. According to the majority, the rule of law requires that
correctness apply for the review of certain categories of questions—constitutional questions,
general questions of law of central importance to the legal system as a whole, and questions related
to the jurisdictional boundaries between two or more administrative bodies. 56 According to the
majority, applying the correctness standard to the review of these questions “respects the unique
role of the judiciary in interpreting the Constitution and ensures that courts are able to provide the
last word on questions for which the rule of law requires consistency and for which a final and
determinate answer is necessary.”57
The majority conceded that in setting out these five ways to rebut the presumption of
reasonableness, it was not foreclosing the possibility that another ground of rebuttal could emerge
in time. However, it notes that “at this time … these reasons address all of the situations in which
a reviewing court should derogate from the presumption of reasonableness review.”58 Further, the
majority strongly discourages parties from making context-based arguments to identify other
categories and sets a high bar for recognition of new grounds for rebuttal.59
With this new framework, the majority not only adopted a new approach to judicial review
but also erased two major questions that have been lingering and generating debate in
administrative law for years: when are contextual factors relevant to determining the standard of
review in a particular case? (Answer: Never, except in the rare instance when a new “category of
derogation” is warranted.) And do “true questions of jurisdiction” exist and thereby warrant
another category of correctness? (Answer, no).

B. THE APPLICATION OF REASONABLENESS
The second new feature of the Vavilov approach to judicial review is its revised understanding of
reasonableness. In introducing this understanding, the majority is striving, they say, for an
approach to reasonableness that “focuses on justification, offers methodological consistency and
reinforces the principle ‘that reasoned decision-making is the lynchpin of institutional
legitimacy.’”60
The majority’s framing of Vavilov reasonableness is familiar. The majority recalls and
relies on much of the pre-Vavilov jurisprudence to frame its conception of reasonableness. It
continues to be a standard calling for “judicial restraint” and respect for the “distinct role of
administrative decision makers.”61 In a case in which reasons must be provided, the standard of
reasonableness asks a reviewing court to begin with the reasons provided by a decision maker,
“examining the reasons provided with ‘respectful attention’ and seeking to understand the
reasoning process followed by the decision maker to arrive at its conclusion.”62 The reviewing
court is to be concerned with the outcome of an administrative decision-making process, as well
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as the reasoning followed. 63 Further, it is, as it has been since Dunsmuir and Khosa, a “‘single
standard that takes its colour from the context.’”64 And ultimately, reasonableness is not a standard
that demands perfection of administrative decision-makers,65 but rather seeks to ensure that the
exercise of public power is characterized by the “hallmarks of reasonableness—justification,
transparency and intelligibility.”66
This framing of reasonableness is familiar but should not be taken to mean that Vavilov
reasonableness is the same as Dunsmuir reasonableness. If Vavilov is applied as the majority seems
to suggest it should be, reasonableness is now more demanding of both administrative decisionmakers and reviewing judges. It expands the meaning of reasonableness, expanding the grounds
on which decisions can be quashed on judicial review. It holds that reasonable outcomes cannot
stand if reached through flawed or incomplete reasoning,67 and reviewing judges are not, in the
normal course, to fill gaps in administrative reasoning.68
And so, what makes a decision unreasonable? The majority identifies “two types of
fundamental flaws” that will reveal a decision’s unreasonableness: a failure of rationality internal
to the reasoning process and a failure of justification in light of the legal and factual constraints
that bear on the decision. 69 While not exhaustive, these failures are sufficient to establish
unreasonableness if “sufficiently central or significant” to a decision.70 On the first type of flaw, a
decision will be unreasonable if the reasons for it, “read holistically,” do not “reveal a rational
chain of analysis,” “reveal that the decision was based on an irrational chain of analysis,” show
that “the conclusion reached cannot follow from the analysis undertaken,” “do not make it possible
to understand the decision maker’s reasoning on a critical point,” or “exhibit clear logical fallacies,
such as circular reasoning, false dilemmas, unfounded generalizations or an absurd premise.”71 On
the second type of flaw, a decision will be unreasonable if it is not justified “in relation to the
constellation of law and facts that are relevant to the decision.”72 The catalogue of relevant
elements include, but are not limited to, “the governing statutory scheme, other relevant statutory
or common law, the principles of statutory interpretation, the evidence before the decision maker
and facts of which the decision maker may take notice, the submissions of the parties, the past
practices and decisions of the administrative body, and the potential impact of the decision on the
individual to whom it applies.”73 This catalogue is not intended to be a checklist and the relevant
elements will always depend on the context. Ultimately, the task of the reviewing court is to
determine whether the reasons and outcome, read in light of the relevant contextual elements,
cause the court to “lose confidence in the outcome reached.”74 If so, the decision is unreasonable.
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As promised, the majority’s discussion of reasonableness in Vavilov is more specific and
prescriptive than the conceptual and case-by-case approach to reasonableness seen in the
Dunsmuir era. This specificity aligns with the majority’s stated goal: to provide real guidance to
courts that have struggled with the application of reasonableness in practice. The majority disputes
the minority’s claims that Vavilov reasonableness is a “‘eulogy’ for deference” and that the
majority’s approach will operate as a “checklist for ‘line-by-line’ reasonableness review.”75 The
majority contends that its “clear wording” and “the delicate balance” underlying the framework
counter the minority’s claims. 76 It’s true that the text of the majority opinion embraces deference
and rejects a line-by-line approach to reasonableness review. But the “delicate balance” to which
the majority refers is less obvious and the majority’s rigorous review of the Registrar of
Citizenship’s reasons under the reasonableness standard is deferential only insofar as it starts from
the administrative reasons provided.
Moreover, by identifying a set of contextual elements that are relevant to assessing the
reasonableness of a decision, the Vavilov approach advises reviewing judges to move through
them, one-by-one. While this “checklist” may not demand a “line-by-line” review of the
administrative decision, it entails a fairly searching review of the reasons provided. Further, the
majority indicates that a reviewing court must ensure that administrative reasoning sets out a chain
of analysis that supports the conclusion; meaningfully accounts for the issues and concerns raised
by the parties; is justified in light of the evidence; is consistent with the general principles of
statutory interpretation; avoids any circular reasoning; addresses binding precedents and statutory
provisions; is consistent with applicable international norms; and so on. How could a reviewing
court ensure that these features of a reasonable decision are accounted for without something akin
to a line-by-line review of the reasons offered by the administrative decision-maker?
Simply put, Vavilov reasonableness is more demanding than Dunsmuir reasonableness.
The indicators of unreasonableness just listed are new and go beyond any list of well-established
examples from past cases. They set expectations that may not be, for lack of a better word,
unreasonable in some administrative contexts. But, as will be discussed below, these expectations
do not adequately account for the radical diversity of decision-makers within the administrative
state. Further, it is disingenuous for the majority to suggest that the specific guidance it offers on
reasonableness is merely a restatement, consolidation, or “clarification” of existing approaches to
reasonableness.77 Vavilov reasonableness is new.

C. THE BIGGER CONSTITUTIONAL PICTURE
What are we to take from Vavilov’s new approach to judicial review? In terms of measuring its
practical impact on judicial review, only time will tell. The Court is trying to affect real change
and indeed, as described above, Vavilov turns away from Dunsmuir in meaningful analytical and
conceptual ways. Early applications of the Vavilov approach indicate that it could offer courts a
basis for more intrusive reasonableness review in some cases,78 but there is also caselaw to the
contrary.79 And there’s no denying that correctness will apply more often in the Vavilov era than
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it did in the age of Dunsmuir. This is inevitable when statutory appeal mechanisms and judicial
review are no longer governed by the same standards of review. A different question is how the
revised approach will trickle down to the administrative realm and affect administrative practice,
and thus, the parties subject to administrative action. Again, we can only speculate at present, but
it seems hard to imagine that there will be no effect. The Vavilov understanding of reasonableness
demands more of administrative actors than did Dunsmuir in terms of reason-giving, statutory
interpretation, and traditional legal analysis. Will decision-makers embrace or resist these
demands? Or, more precisely, which decision-makers in what circumstances will embrace these
demands and which decision-makers in what circumstances will resist them? What shapes will this
embrace or resistance take? How will Vavilov be reflected in internal policies and procedures
developed at the agency level? What training will be offered to administrative decision-makers in
order to establish the conditions in which the Vavilov standards can be met?
Similar questions should be asked at the level of legislative drafting. Will Vavilov have an
effect on legislative design of administrative actors? While legislatures have always had the power
to expressly prescribe standards of review and legislate the parameters of judicial review, the
traditional judicial approach to privative clauses has perhaps undermined legislative motivation to
prescribe standards of review.80 Vavilov’s affirmation that the courts will implement legislated
standards of review, subject to constitutional concerns, may renew legislative energy to follow
British Columbia’s footsteps in expressly identifying generally applicable standards of review.81
Indeed, Vavilov reminds legislatures of their power in this regard.
These questions about the practical impact of Vavilov will—and should—be the subject of
study going forward. But what can be said now about Vavilov on doctrinal and jurisprudential
grounds? Of particular interest here is what Vavilov offers to the understandings of Canada’s
constitutional structure and of the relationship between administrative action and constitutional
meaning. As noted above, all cases of judicial review are constitutional in the small “c” sense. At
their heart and in very practical terms, they are cases about the proper relationship between
branches of government and between particular actors within those branches. The standard of
review analysis demands that we consider the relationship between the judiciary, executive actors,
the legislature that created and empowered those actors, and the individuals affected by the
impugned executive action. Accordingly, in every instance of judicial review of administrative
action, the standard of review analysis is a proxy for charting and understanding the specific
arrangement of the public institutions involved. Applying the standard of review is a similarly
constitutional exercise. It requires a reviewing court to assess the legality of some executive action
from a particular vantage point and in light of specific contextual factors. This vantage point is
defined by constitutional relationships, those between the branches of government, and the
contextual factors include not only input from legislation and executive policies and procedures,
but also demands of the broader principles and grander institutional configurations that structure
how the judiciary, the administrative state, the executive, the public, and the legislature are to
interact with each other. In this way, every exercise of judicial review necessarily “bear[s] on
organs of government” and thus implicates constitutional questions of a structural order.82 Each
case, Vavilov included, is, then, at a minimum, an implicit statement about constitutionalism, the
arrangement of the public order, and the place of the administrative state in that public order.
80

See e.g. Dunsmuir, supra note 26 at paras 52 and 143.
See e.g. Administrative Tribunals Act, SBC 2004, c 45, ss 58-59.
82
Secession Reference, supra note 10 at para 50; OPSEU, supra note 3 at 57; Supreme Court Act Reference, supra
note 10 at para 82; Senate Reform Reference, supra note 9 at para 26.
81

Published by Osgoode Digital Commons, 2021

80

Journal of Law and Social Policy, Vol. 34 [2021], Art. 4

Vavilov is, of course, more than just a case of exercising powers of judicial review. It is the
flagship case in the Supreme Court’s project of renovating the Canadian approach to judicial
review. As such, the majority’s reasons serve as an explicit statement of the judges’ vision of the
constitutional order, including the administrative state’s place within that order and the
relationships between the branches of government. The vision underlies the approach to judicial
review set out above. Judicial review necessarily bears on relationships between organs of
government and speaks to the powers and responsibilities of state actors. In effect, judicial review
is always an expression of constitutional structure; it must therefore be shaped and carried out with
a deep appreciation of that structure and its legal implications. If this is the case, it seems to go
without saying that the necessary structural analysis and appreciation must include some
understanding and appreciation of the nature of the administrative state and its place in the
constitutional order. A court cannot meaningfully design or execute an approach to judicial review
without a rich account of the nature, character, powers, duties, and status of the administrative
state in the grander public order, that is, in relation to the other major and local institutions of
governance. Moreover, this account must be up to date, speaking to the realities of the
administrative state as it is rather than as it was in earlier eras categorized by continued growth of
the administrative sector rather than its well-established ubiquity.83
The majority opinion in Vavilov does not expressly offer such a vision of the administrative
state and looking deeper at the reasoning, we are left wondering what that vision might be. On the
majority approach, administrative decision-makers are owed deference but that deference comes
in the form of strict judicial oversight and in a hierarchical rule of law culture in which judges
know best. Moreover, the majority aims to enhance the legitimacy of administrative decisions by
cultivating a strong culture of justification,84 but to do so, it expects the reasoning of administrative
actors subject to review (in addition to those subject to judicial appeal) to increasingly replicate
that of courts. Further still, the majority affirms the distinctive and challenging diversity that
characterizes the expansive set of actors that comprise the administrative state, but then writes out
most of that diversity in both its standard of review analysis and its guidance on how to review
administrative decisions.
There may be a coherent vision of the administrative state in the majority’s reasoning; the
tensions and aspirations underlying administrative justice and judicial review are not necessarily
amenable to or in need of resolution. But what that vision might be or how the majority might
explain its embrace of sustained tension is not obvious or even acknowledged. More attention to
structural reasoning, and to the constitutional questions at stake, in administrative law and judicial
review could have reminded the majority to contemplate these issues more deeply in developing
its approach to judicial review in Vavilov and offered guidance for realizing its aspirations for
judicial review going forward. Moreover, it could have avoided rendering Vavilov another example
of insufficiently structural and constitutional thinking in administrative law. And it could have
seized the opportunity to model, in approach and substance, the kind of public law thinking that is
needed in cases, cases like Toronto (City), as discussed below, that must assess the legal
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consequences of institutional actions and relationships that involve or affect actors within the
administrative state. 85
In addition, the majority’s reasoning raises questions about how to understand the position
of the administrative state within the constitutional order as a whole, yet these questions—and any
account of their answers—go unacknowledged in the majority reasons. The biggest shift on this
issue flows from the majority’s justification for the presumption of deference. In the Dunsmuir era
of judicial review, deference to administrative decision-makers was justified at least in part
because of features of the administrative actor involved or of the administrative state as a whole,
features such as field of expertise, specialized contextual knowledge within a particular legislative
sphere, and on the ground experience with the polycentric issues to be dealt with by the
administrative agency. But after Vavilov, the presumption of deference is justified not because of
any feature or set of features of an administrative actor but rather because of executive and
legislative policy decisions to delegate some authority to a statutory body. Thus, the nature of the
administrative decision-maker, and the special circumstances in which decision-makers operate,
is irrelevant.
The majority’s shift in thinking on this point—the revised justification for the presumption
of deference—is the result of structural reasoning. It is an artefact of the majority’s analysis of
which institutional powers are of primary importance when setting the parameters of judicial
review. According to the Vavilov majority, the legislative decision to delegate and how to construct
that delegation is the foundation of the approach as a whole. The majority’s reasoning fits with the
concerns of structural constitutionalists—it is about institutional relationships and powers. But the
majority’s commitment to the structural constitutionalist perspective, more specifically, its
structural reasoning, is thin because it fails to acknowledge its revised justification for deference
as a constitutional shift. It justifies the change in pragmatic terms. As explained above, with the
new approach, there is no need to assess the expertise of individual decision-makers, there is a
degree of certainty available to parties seeking judicial review, access to justice is promoted, and
so on. But the revised approach to deference does reflect a structural shift—the administrative state
has been demoted from active agent to legislative observer. This shift not only affects the
administrative state’s relative power but also raises questions about other administrative doctrines
and powers—such as the power of an administrative decision-maker to hear and decide
constitutional questions—that have been justified in terms of administrative strength, expertise,
specialization, and access to justice. 86 Does Vavilov undermine the authority of those precedents?
The critique offered in this article is, in part, in agreement with a claim that has been raised
elsewhere that one of Vavilov’s shortcomings is its lack of engagement with principle. For
example, Paul Daly has argued that the majority’s reasoning ultimately prioritizes pragmatism
over principle, and has provided examples from the reasoning where this can be seen.87 I agree
and both this part and the next elaborate some of those examples. Noting the prioritization of
pragmatism over principle is an important and useful comment on Vavilov as it highlights the need
to be attentive to the practical, conceptual, and jurisprudential dimensions of the judgment, and to
interrogate the choices made by the judges. As Daly explains, there may be good reasons to strive
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for pragmatism at this particular administrative law moment however, that does not diminish or
erase the effect of choosing to do so on the theoretical richness (or thinness) of Vavilov.88
This article is similarly concerned with the theoretical wanting of Vavilov but the focus is
somewhat different. The claim here is that by failing to engage on the level of principle, in
particular principles of importance in administrative and structural constitutionalism, Vavilov is
too self-regarding; it is too narrow in its outlook. It fails to acknowledge that the structural and
constitutional questions at stake in every instance of judicial review are heightened in the exercise
of articulating a new judicial approach to judicial review, and as a result, does not deeply engage
with these questions. It positions itself as a transformative but pragmatic administrative law case.
In this framing, the majority ignores the much more expansive public law terrain on which the case
sits.
In seizing Vavilov as an opportunity to undertake a project of reforming judicial review,
the Court signalled that Vavilov would be an example of grand administrative law thinking; it
intended the case to be transformative and to begin a new era of judicial review. The administrative
law trilogy was therefore an opportunity for the Court to model the kind of deep structural and
constitutional thinking that must underlie an approach to judicial review. Unfortunately, by
prioritizing pragmatism at the expense of principle and by failing to acknowledge constitutional
dimensions of its new approach, Vavilov missed that opportunity.

II. MORE MISSED OPPORTUNITIES IN VAVILOV (AND THEIR
BROADER IMPACT)
The preceding part dealt with a structural shortcoming in the majority’s reasoning on the new
approach to judicial review itself. This part turns its focus to two ways in which the Vavilov
majority missed opportunities to engage with relevant matters of constitutional structure. It
highlights the broader impact of these missed opportunities within public law using the case study
of the Toronto (City) litigation. In brief, in Toronto (City) the City of Toronto (“City” or “Toronto”)
is challenging the constitutionality of provisions of the Better Local Government Act, 2018 89
(“BLGA”), arguing that these provisions contravene section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms,90 section 92(18) of the Constitution Act, 1867,91 and unwritten constitutional
principles. In short, the Better Local Government Act, 2018 amended the City of Toronto Act,
2006,92 the Municipal Act, 2001,93 and the Municipal Elections Act, 199694 with the effect of
redrawing Toronto’s electoral map, requiring that the 2018 municipal election in Toronto proceed
on the basis of the revised electoral map, and providing that Toronto’s City Council would now be
composed of one councillor for each of the new wards.95 In effect, the BLGA reduced the number
of electoral wards in the City, and thus the membership of the Council, from forty-seven to twentyfive.
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The most controversial feature of the BLGA was its timing. It came into force on 14 August
2018, in the middle of the City’s 2018 municipal election. The nomination period for the election
had opened on 1 May 2018 and closed on 27 July 2018, and the election was scheduled for 22
October 2018. Though the BLGA extended the nomination period until 14 September 2018, it
retained the October election date. This extension did not address the time, money, care, and
energy that had already been invested by candidates. The evidence established that at the time the
BLGA came into force, candidates seeking Council seats had relied on the original forty-sevenward electoral structure when deciding where to run, the content of their platforms, how to connect
with voters, fundraising models, and the design of their publicity campaigns. Indeed, “[a] great
deal of the candidate’s time and money had been invested within the boundaries of a particular
ward when the ward numbers and sizes were suddenly changed.”96
The City’s constitutional challenge was successful at first instance.97 Justice Belobaba of
the Superior Court held that the BLGA contravened section 2(b) of the Charter and could not be
justified under section 1. He declared the impugned provisions of the BLGA to be of no force and
effect and ordered the election to proceed as originally planned, on the basis of a forty-seven-ward
model and a forty-seven-member Council. As it was unnecessary to do so, Belobaba J did not
address the other constitutional arguments raised. In September 2018, the Court of Appeal granted
a stay of Justice Belobaba’s order pending appeal. 98 Accordingly, the election proceeded on the
basis of a twenty-five-ward electoral map. In September 2019, a five-judge panel of the Court of
Appeal allowed Ontario’s appeal of Belobaba J’s order. A majority of the panel concluded that the
BLGA did not infringe section 2(b) of the Charter and that none of the other constitutional
arguments could succeed. 99 In rejecting these alternative arguments, Justice Miller held that
“unwritten constitutional principles do not invest the judiciary with a free-standing power to
invalidate legislation” and could not, as a result, be relied on to invalidate the BLGA. 100 Further,
he concluded that the unwritten constitutional principles of democracy and the rule of law were of
no use in interpreting provincial legislative authority over municipalities provided for in section
92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867. As there was no open question of constitutional interpretation
or a new legislative subject matter at stake in this case, unwritten constitutional principles were
not relevant to delineating the province’s expansive legislative power over municipalities. 101
The case is now headed to the Supreme Court of Canada. In its materials, the City identifies
three issues for the Court:102 First, does the Charter protect “the expression of electoral participants
from substantial mid-election changes to the election framework and rules?” Second, can
legislation be declared of no force and effect because it is inconsistent with the unwritten
constitutional principles of democracy and/or the rule of law? And third, are municipal electors
constitutionally entitled to effective representation?
This summary shows that in approach, Toronto (City) is a standard constitutional challenge
to legislation. In that sense, it may seem to be unrelated to, and likely unaffected by, the Supreme
Court’s judgment in Vavilov. That initial reaction makes Toronto (City) an apt case study for this
article, as my point is that the insights of structural and administrative constitutionalism from
Vavilov are pertinent beyond the narrow judicial review context, thereby bolstering calls for greater
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unity in public law analysis. To make this point, I turn now to two additional issues of
constitutional structure that are at stake in Vavilov but which remain underdeveloped in the
majority’s reasoning. These issues are not exhaustive of the kinds of sub-issues of structural and
administrative constitutionalism at stake in cases of judicial review, but they are illustrative of the
problem. The discussion of each example offers some insight into what the majority opinion
implicitly says on these issues and considers the impact of this reasoning not only in Vavilov and
in the judicial review context, but also outside of administrative law.

A. UNWRITTEN PRINCIPLES AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
LEGISLATION
The first structural issue that is implicated but not discussed in Vavilov is the constitutionality of
legislation that is inconsistent with an unwritten principle of the Constitution. The issue is
particularly interesting and fraught when the legislation in question deals with the powers and
mandate of a public decision-maker, who is, of course, itself bound by the Constitution and its
principles.
This issue is addressed directly in Toronto (City). In his majority reasons, Miller JA rejects
the City’s argument that provisions of the BLGA should be declared of no force and effect because
they are inconsistent with unwritten principles of the Constitution, namely, democracy and the rule
of law. Noting the primacy of constitutional text, concerns about “judicial governance,” and the
near impossibility of legislative response to judicial declarations of invalidity,103 Miller JA
concludes, as noted above, that “unwritten constitutional principles do not invest the judiciary with
a free-standing power to invalidate legislation” and so they “cannot be invoked to invalidate the
Act.”104
Justice Miller rightly notes that the role of unwritten principles in invalidating statutory
provisions is contested.105 But his definitive conclusion that unwritten principles writ large cannot
be the basis of a declaration of constitutional invalidity is not consistent with the jurisprudence.
While the courts have declined to declare legislative provisions of no force and effect when there
is no inconsistency with an unwritten principle,106 the Supreme Court has indicated its willingness
to make such declarations when such an inconsistency arises.107
In the administrative and executive spheres, certain unwritten constitutional principles give
rise to substantive legal obligations and have combined to construct the scaffolding for procedural
design.108 The unwritten principle of judicial independence also sustains legislative obligations to
implement specific decision-making procedures when certain conditions, such as judicial salary
negotiations and, as I argue elsewhere, investigation of complaints against federally appointed
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judges, are met.109 These are uses of the Constitution’s unwritten principles that are in addition to
the interpretive and structural purposes that the principles serve. As the Supreme Court explains
in the Secession Reference, the unwritten principles “breathe life” into the Constitution,
“dictat[ing] major elements of the architecture of the Constitution itself and are as such its
lifeblood.”110 They assist in “the interpretation of the text and the delineation of spheres of
jurisdiction, the scope of rights and obligations, and the role of our political institutions.”111 And
they are, the Court explained, meaningful sources of legal obligation:
Underlying constitutional principles may in certain circumstances give rise to
substantive legal obligations (have “full legal force”, as we described it in the
Patriation Reference, supra, at p. 845), which constitute substantive limitations upon
government action. These principles may give rise to very abstract and general
obligations, or they may be more specific and precise in nature. The principles are not
merely descriptive, but are also invested with a powerful normative force, and are
binding upon both courts and governments. “In other words”, as this Court confirmed
in the Manitoba Language Rights Reference, supra, at p. 752, “in the process of
Constitutional adjudication, the Court may have regard to unwritten postulates which
form the very foundation of the Constitution of Canada.”112
There are general observations that can be made about unwritten principles, as seen in the
Secession Reference, but it does not follow that all principles can or will serve all purposes in any
particular situation or that each principle has the same normative effects as any other principle in
specific cases. The details, including the meaning and content of any principle that is relevant in
the circumstances, will always be determinative. This must be true in Toronto (City), as it is in
every case. But the details must be examined; a simple rejection of the possibility of legislative
unconstitutionality stemming from unwritten principles is not borne out in the jurisprudence.
Vavilov was an opportunity for the Court to offer insight into the role of unwritten
principles in assessing the constitutionality of legislation. In fact, the majority’s new approach to
judicial review directly raised the issue, but the majority does not acknowledge or engage with it.
Implicitly, though, the majority reasoning in Vavilov signals support for an argument that Miller
JA erred in his definitive conclusion on unwritten principles. While the majority fails to complete
its analysis on this point, the effect of Vavilov is that in at least some circumstances, legislation
will not be given effect if it is inconsistent with the rule of law.
The issue arises in Vavilov in relation to legislative prescriptions of the standard of review.
Recall that one of the circumstances in which we are to derogate from the presumption of
reasonableness is when the legislature identifies the applicable standard of review. The majority
explains, “[w]here a court reviews the merits of an administrative decision … the standard of
review it applies must reflect the legislature’s intent with respect to the role of the reviewing court,
except where giving effect to that intent is precluded by the rule of law.” 113 Explaining further, the
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majority contends that the courts must apply a legislated standard of review in order to give effect
to legislative intent. The only limit will be the rule of law:
It follows that where a legislature has indicated that courts are to apply the standard of
correctness in reviewing certain questions, that standard must be applied. In British
Columbia, the legislature has established the applicable standard of review for many
tribunals by reference to the Administrative Tribunals Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 45: see ss.
58 and 59. For example, it has provided that the standard of review applicable to
decisions on questions of statutory interpretation by the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal
is to be correctness: ibid., s. 59(1); Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210, s. 32.
We continue to be of the view that where the legislature has indicated the applicable
standard of review, courts are bound to respect that designation, within the limits
imposed by the rule of law.114
Imagine, then, legislation that provides that a tribunal’s decisions regarding the division of
powers are to be reviewed on the standard of reasonableness. What is the constitutional status of
this legislative provision? The new standard of review analysis requires legislative prescriptions
be followed. However, it also requires that legislative prescriptions be followed unless they are
inconsistent with the rule of law. Recall that the majority also holds that the rule of law requires
that constitutional questions be reviewed on a standard of correctness. 115 It seems to follow that a
court cannot give effect to a legislated standard of reasonableness on review of a constitutional
question dealing with the division of powers.
The majority does not call attention to the consequences of this conclusion or engage with
the debates regarding unwritten principles. Those broader debates remain under the reasoning’s
surface. But the implication of the majority’s reasoning is clear—legislative intent, even legislative
intent clearly articulated in an otherwise valid statute, is constrained by the rule of law. Judicial
review is, therefore, a context in which legislation that is inconsistent with the rule of law will not
be given full effect.
One might argue that this amounts to treating legislated standards of review like privative
clauses: they are not given effect but are not unconstitutional. Yet this analogy does not work on
the Vavilov model. The presence or absence of a privative clause was accounted for in the
pragmatic and functional approach and the Dunsmuir contextual analysis. The legislative intent
behind a privative clause was “given effect” insofar as it was folded into a broader contextual
assessment of what standard of review should apply in a particular case. But the majority in Vavilov
has abandoned any contextual analysis in the standard of review analysis. In the Vavilov universe,
the only basis to refuse to give effect to legislative intent is the Constitution. And with this
example, the constitutional basis is the unwritten principle of the rule of law.
This issue is a clear matter of structural constitutionalism—a question of the normative and
operational status of the unwritten principles and of the pressures these principles can exert on
legislative action. The majority’s reasoning in Vavilov points to an undeniable potential for conflict
in the circumstances—the rule of law cannot tolerate a posture of deference on a federalism
question. But the majority offers no guidance on the constitutional consequences of this conflict.
More broadly, by not acknowledging the issue, the Court misses the opportunity to signal to public
law counsel and scholars to consider this manifestation of the conflict between unwritten principles
114
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and legislation. It thus keeps this conflict between principle and prescription tucked within the
administrative law sphere, without either drawing constitutional considerations into the
administrative law analysis or projecting the issue into constitutional circles for consideration.
Without merging the constitutional and administrative perspectives in this context, the majority
reasoning in Vavilov signals that administrative law—and the administrative state—has its own
constitutional law rather than participates in the development and elucidation of “regular”
constitutional law. The majority had the chance to explain and justify this reasoning, limiting it if
desired (and if possible). Instead, the reasons do not engage with the issue. The issue of the impact
of unwritten principles on the constitutionality of legislation that affects administrative action is
thus left to be resolved in Toronto (City), where the issue is raised head on.

B. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
The second structural issue that is implicated but remains under-analyzed in Vavilov is the legal
significance of institutional design and reform. This claim may seem strange because the majority
positions institutional design at the heart of its new standard of review analysis. As explained
above, the majority justifies the new presumption of reasonableness, as well as one of the two
grounds for derogating from this presumption, in terms of the legislature’s institutional design
choices. With respect to the presumption, the majority explains that since the late 1970s, “the
central rationale for applying a deferential standard of review in administrative law has been
respect for the legislature’s institutional design choice to delegate certain matters to non-judicial
decision makers through statute.”116 While other ‘sub’-rationales have also been offered to explain
decisions to delegate authority to administrative decision-makers, such as expertise, efficiency,
cost, and access to justice, the majority holds that those sub-rationales can all fall under the
umbrella of institutional design choices. They explain, “[w]hile specialized expertise and these
other rationales may all be reasons for a legislature to delegate decision-making authority, a
reviewing court need not evaluate which of these rationales apply in the case of a particular
decision maker in order to determine the standard of review. Instead … it is the very fact that the
legislature has chosen to delegate authority which justifies a default position of reasonableness
review.”117
Similarly, on the Vavilov model, a legislature’s choice to define the relationship between
an administrative actor and a reviewing court by either prescribing a standard of review or
establishing a mechanism by which an administrative actor’s decisions can be appealed to the
courts will be determinative of the applicable standard of review: whatever the legislature
prescribes in the first instance, and the regular appellate standards in the second. These too are
design choices, this time, explicit choices, about how to structure the relationship between
institutions, rather than a choice to create and design a single organization.
In this sense, it seems that the Vavilov majority is sensitive to the significance of
institutional design in administrative law and public law relationships more broadly. And indeed,
this sensitivity is an advance in the law as it avoids the easily undermined reliance on expertise,
expediency, or cost-effectiveness that has justified deference in the past. But in looking more
deeply at the majority’s approach to institutional design in the Vavilov decision as a whole, we see
that it too needs greater consistency, reach, and nuance. Consider a few examples.
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First, the majority does not explain why the only design choices that are relevant to the
new standard of review analysis are delegation, prescribed standards of review, and statutory
appeal mechanisms. On the acontextual analysis that Vavilov demands, other design choices, and
the interaction of the institutional features that flow from those choices, are irrelevant. What if, as
Daly asks, an administrative actor’s enabling statute includes both a privative clause and a statutory
appeal? 118 The former, which also reflects a legislative choice about institutional design, would
not be considered in the choice of standard of review. Further, what about the substantive purpose
or mandate bestowed upon an administrative actor? This empowering and limiting legislative
statement about the role that the actor is intended to play in the public order is, on the Vavilov
model, also irrelevant to determining standard of review. In other words, it is irrelevant to
determining whether a reviewing court owes deference to the decision-maker. This would be so
even if it provided a strong indicator that deference should not be shown. Again, the majority
leaves us wondering why some design choices are to be prioritized over others.
Second, when it comes to applying the standard of reasonableness, the majority notes two
fundamental flaws that reveal a decision’s unreasonableness. One is a form of contextual
analysis—a reasonable decision must be justified in light of the relevant factual and legal
constraints that operate on the decision maker. Those constraints include a set of legal and factual
considerations that may be accounted for in any particular decision-making context. However,
when the majority lists the constraints and applies them to the facts in Vavilov, there is no
consideration of the nature of the decision-maker or its unique and particular set of institutional
features. This is so even though the majority retains the general principles from Dunsmuir,
Khosa,119 and Newfoundland Nurses120 that “the particular context of a decision constrains what
will be reasonable for an administrative decision maker to decide in a given case” and that the
“review of an administrative decision can be divorced neither from the institutional context in
which the decision was made nor from the history of the proceedings.”121 These signals of the
importance of the nature of an administrative decision-maker, its design features, and its
operational realities are not, for the most part, reflected in the list of constraints that the majority
goes on to identify as relevant (i.e. the statutory and common law applicable to the decision-maker,
the principles of statutory interpretation, the evidence before the decision-maker, the submissions
of the parties, the potential impact of the decision on the individual to whom it applies).
The two potential exceptions included in the majority’s list are the administrative decisionmaker’s enabling statute and the past practices of the administrative actor. Both factors open the
door to considering some institutional design features and the nature of a decision-maker in
assessing what amounts to a reasonable decision in the particular decision-making context under
review. That said, this potential is not particularly promising when read in conjunction with the
majority’s review of the Registrar’s cancellation decision in Vavilov. That review, which is the
first example of how to operationalize Vavilov, did not consider the nature, design, or features of
the Registrar when concluding that her decision was unreasonable. The Registrar’s enabling statute
was examined only with respect to the principles of statutory interpretation, not in a contextual
analysis of what a reasonable decision of the Registrar should or could look like.
Third and finally, the majority suggests that it is alive to the radical diversity that
characterizes the administrative state in Canada. The majority writes that its new approach
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“accommodates all types of administrative decision making, in areas that range from immigration,
prison administration and social security entitlements to labour relations, securities regulation and
energy policy.”122 The majority expressly acknowledges that the diversity of decision-makers is
an undeniable challenge for administrative law:
In any attempt to develop a coherent and unified approach to judicial review, the sheer
variety of decisions and decision makers that such an approach must account for poses
an inescapable challenge. The administrative decision makers whose decisions may be
subject to judicial review include specialized tribunals exercising adjudicative
functions, independent regulatory bodies, ministers, front-line decision makers, and
more. Their decisions vary in complexity and importance, ranging from the routine to
the life-altering. These include matters of “high policy” on the one hand and “pure
law” on the other. Such decisions will sometimes involve complex technical
considerations. At other times, common sense and ordinary logic will suffice. 123
The majority goes on to say that its approach to reasonableness attends to this diversity
within the administrative state:
The approach to reasonableness review that we articulate in these reasons accounts for
the diversity of administrative decision making by recognizing that what is reasonable
in a given situation will always depend on the constraints imposed by the legal and
factual context of the particular decision under review. These contextual constraints
dictate the limits and contours of the space in which the decision maker may act and
the types of solutions it may adopt. The fact that the contextual constraints operating
on an administrative decision maker may vary from one decision to another does not
pose a problem for the reasonableness standard, because each decision must be both
justified by the administrative body and evaluated by reviewing courts in relation to
its own particular context.124
The majority’s acknowledgment that the administrative state comprises a diverse and
sprawling set of decision-makers that differ across many metrics is an important affirmation of
administrative law’s challenge—to be relevant and meaningful across this diversity. But how the
majority’s approach actually accounts for this diversity is unclear. The acontextual nature of the
Vavilov standard of review analysis now applies correctness to legal determinations by
sophisticated tribunals subject to appeal, but does not account for the repeated pleas from
marginalized and vulnerable communities in the corrections and immigration sectors for greater
oversight of the reviewable (rather than appealable) decisions to which they are subject day-today.125 Moreover, as explained above, the legal and factual constraints that are to be considered in
the application of reasonableness provide little incentive or opportunity to seriously account for
the institutional context in which an administrative decision is made. How then is diversity within
the administrative state accounted for in practice? How would the majority’s review have been
any different had it been reviewing the decision of the Minister of Citizenship rather than the
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Registrar or, for that matter, had it been reviewing a decision of the National Energy Board rather
than the Registrar? Beyond its statement that context matters, the answers to these questions
remain uncertain.
With each of these examples, we see the majority indicating that the nature and design of
administrative decision-makers, both their internal design and the configuration of their
relationships to other institutions, are important considerations in judicial review. These are
meaningful (and correct) affirmations—administrative law must care deeply about institutional
design if it can offer any guidance about the fairness or integrity of government decision-making.
But in each of the ways set out above, the majority’s affirmations are revealed to be superficial
and undermined either in application or when read in the context of the decision as a whole. This
is so even though the Court received submissions from twenty-seven intervenors in this trilogy of
cases that offered the Court perspectives from a diverse set of administrative sectors, including
labour, immigration, landlord and tenant, prison administration, securities, environmental
regulation, workplace health and safety, workers’ compensation, pharmacy regulation, children’s
aid, government ministries, and so on. Again, we see a lack of careful attention to the questions
and realities of institutional design in the administrative sphere in a case that positions itself as the
major rethink of judicial review.
In effect, then, the signal the majority ultimately sends is that institutional design and the
nature of decision-makers are important to understanding the work of administrative actors and
defining the relationship between the courts and the administrative state, but either not sufficiently
important or not sufficiently understood to be operationalized in a coherent or nuanced way across
the new judicial approach to judicial review. Both reasons are consequences of the chronic
inattention to structural matters in public law thinking. Thus again, by examining the majority’s
approach to institutional design, we can see that Vavilov was an opportunity to model the kind of
thinking that is needed in order to assess the significance of institutional design and the impact of
design reform on institutions and their relationships, but the opportunity was missed.
Toronto (City) is a case in which we see the need for better understandings of the
significance of institutional design and reform, and such modeling of structural thinking in public
law cases. So far, the impugned state action in Toronto (City) has been framed in terms of the
legislature’s redrawing of the electoral ward map and its corresponding reduction of the
membership of Toronto’s City Council. The reduction in membership is framed in terms of
interference with rights to effective representation and free political expression. In light of the
electoral rights and free speech claims asserted by the City and affected candidates and electors,
this framing, shaped by constitutional concerns, makes sense.126 But when the BLGA is considered
from an administrative law perspective, a question about institutional design arises. The
administrative law perspective asks whether the BLGA’s reform of Council, which not only
reduced Council’s size and membership but also meaningfully altered (that is, shrunk) Council’s
statutory powers, qualitatively changed the institution to which representatives were being elected.
In contrast, the majority of the Court of Appeal rejected the integrity of this framing. It concluded that the City’s
claim does not genuinely engage concerns about free expression but rather deals with “essentially a political matter”—
that is, dissatisfaction with the timing of the legislature’s decision to reform Council, which, the majority contends, is
“undeniably within the legitimate authority of the legislature” (supra note 90 at para 6). Further, the majority held that
the City’s success at the application stage was a function of judicial rewriting of section 2(b) of the Charter; such a
claim could not be sustained on a proper interpretation of the constitutional text (ibid at para 34). Finally, the majority
rejected the City’s invocation of section 3 of the Charter, whether as an independent claim or as an aid to
understanding the scope of section 2(b) protection. Section 3 does not apply to municipal elections, the majority
concluded, and so is not relevant in this case (ibid at para 76).
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And if this is the case, administrative law asks, what are the constitutional implications of this
qualitative change? At what point does statutory reform of a representative institution, midelection or otherwise, unlawfully interfere with the principle of democracy or electoral rights?
Answering this question requires a nuanced appreciation of the design of governance institutions
and the impact of reform. This has been missing from the Toronto (City) case so far and,
unfortunately, the opportunity in Vavilov to offer some insight into how to sensitively and
rigorously account for design and reform choices was missed.

III. CONCLUSION: VISIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
AND THE BOUNDARIES OF PUBLIC LAW
In Toronto (City), Miller JA began his majority opinion with the observation that the Toronto City
Council is “a creature of provincial legislation. Provincial legislation governs everything from its
composition to the scope of its jurisdiction.”127 With this observation, Justice Miller was making
the point that Toronto City Council (the “Council”) lacks independent constitutional status. Its
mandate and authority, indeed the Council’s very existence, depends entirely on exercises of
provincial legislative power.
Justice Miller’s observation foreshadowed the constitutional analysis that followed and the
majority’s rejection of the City’s claims for constitutional protection of municipal power against
provincial intrusion. The observation also reflects a familiar conception of the administrative state.
By highlighting the Council’s statutory status and character, Miller JA positions the Council as
ordinary and dependent. As just another administrative actor, the Council sits alongside countless
boards, tribunals, agencies, and other public actors that may play important roles in the delivery of
public programs, but which are at the mercy of executive and legislative agendas on delegation.128
This view is familiar and before Vavilov, I would have argued that Justice Miller’s
comments do not account for the possibility that describing administrative actors as merely
creatures of statute might be too simplistic and out-dated in a constitutional order in which
administrative agencies are the principal settings in which individuals interact with the legal
system, have their rights interpreted and implemented, and seek to access justice in their daily
lives. Nor does it account for diversity within the administrative state and how the idiosyncratic
features of a particular administrative actor might be relevant to assessing the place of that actor
in the constitutional order. 129 Indeed, I would have argued that the example of municipal councils
highlights the need to consider whether Miller JA’s blanket account of the nature of administrative
actors is at odds with realities on the ground.
Enabling statutes are just one feature of municipal councils, albeit significant ones. But the
nature of municipal power is unique. Councils are administrative institutions made up of elected
officials who are directly accountable to their constituencies. They exercise legislative and
executive functions that replicate those of the provincial and federal governments. And their
jurisdiction captures the most local aspects of life such that their potential for impact on the daily
lives of individuals, whether for good or ill, is tremendous. Indeed, it is because of the unique
features of municipal councils—their democratic mandate, the nature of their powers, and the
significance of their effect—that the courts have often shown a high degree of deference to council
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decision-making. While municipal councils do not have carte blanche when acting within their
jurisdiction and while they remain subject to their enabling legislation, the Supreme Court has held
that a municipal bylaw will be quashed on judicial review only if it is “one no reasonable body
informed by [the wide variety of factors that could be relevant to municipal councils] could have
taken.”130 Indeed, municipal bylaws tend to be upheld on judicial review unless they were found
to be “aberrant,” “overwhelming,” or unadoptable by any reasonable body. 131 The threshold for
unreasonableness is high.132 All of these features cry out for a constitutional analysis that
appreciates the unique and essential character of municipalities in the public order and that
understands the constitutional status of municipalities accordingly. 133
Vavilov raises questions about claims for constitutional status by downplaying the unique
features of administrative bodies in its account of the roles and relationships at play in judicial
review. This seems to flip the switch on the Dunsmuir era of context-dependent analysis and
administrative strength without an account of why or how to proceed, and without acknowledging
the resulting constitutional shift. In this way, Vavilov participates in the chronic problem in
administrative law that this article aims to expose, a problem that is witnessed in other public law
cases, cases like Toronto (City), that lie at the intersection of constitutional and administrative law.
The problem is insufficient attention to the constitutional questions, and more specifically, the
questions of structural and administrative constitutionalism at stake. 134 Whereas Vavilov represents
a missed opportunity to respond to this problem, perhaps hope lies with Toronto (City).
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